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Book Review: Hedge Fund Structure, Regulation and
Performance around the World
Hedge funds and their managers have been vilified in recent times for their high-risk activities and relative lack
of regulatory oversight. However, while it is frequently suggested that hedge funds are unregulated, they are in
fact regulated to some degree in every country around the world. In this book, the authors consider data from
a multitude of countries to understand how and why hedge fund markets differ around the world. Nicholas
Thomason finds that the more technically minded may wish to supplement the book with other sources but
there is certainly enough here to educate any interested general reader.
Hedge Fund Structure, Regulation and Performance around the
World. Douglas Cumming, Na Dai, and Sofia Johan. Oxford
University Press. March 2013.
Find this book:  
It is perhaps f air to say the layperson’s view of  Hedge Funds is as
protean as the perf ormance returns these investment vehicles produce.
From relative obscurity, this small band of  investment managers have
grown in number and asset size, slowly garnering wider public attention in
turn. Despite their desire f or secrecy, they have of ten been characterised
as buccaneering risk seekers; richly rewarded f or their market insights
and promise of  absolute returns. Post crisis they have been beset by
multi-billion dollar f raud cases, tales of  insider trading and market
manipulation. To boot they have apparently brought systemic risk and
greater market volatility. Average perf ormance has been lousy too.
Yet one view has remained throughout; they have operated with minimal,
of ten no government regulation. In their new book, Douglas Cummings
(Prof essor of  Finance at York University), Na Dai (Associate Prof essor of  Finance at SUNY,
Albany) and Sof ia Johan (Adjunct Prof essor of  Law and Finance at York University), show
this not to be the case. In f act all hedge f unds are to some degree regulated and the authors
empirically analyse how across countries, these dif f erent institutional settings inf luence f und
structure, governance and perf ormance.
At the heart of  the book is the f amiliar principal-agent problem. Investors are both imperf ectly inf ormed as
to the quality of  the hedge f und manager (adverse selection) and unable to observe the manager’s ef f ort
to deliver the best returns (moral hazard). The issue is clouded f urther since it is hard f or investors to
distinguish random environmental f actors f rom the manager’s ef f ort. As a result the manager’s incentives
may not align with the interests of  the investor, who must also bear an agency cost to imperf ectly observe
the manager.
Regulation stems f rom these agency costs and inf ormational asymmetries, yet they are not unif orm across
jurisdictions. The regulation- light approach of  the US contrasts sharply with the stringent environment of
some European counties f or example. Moreover the ef f ect of  regulation is ambiguous. Does lighter
regulation allow mangers to structure their business in the most ef f icient manner to the benef it of  the
investor, or induce low quality managers interested in capturing f ees? To the extent regulation is dif f erent
across borders, how this impacts f und perf ormance, their structure and their governance is explored
throughout the book.
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Government regulation is always prone to the law of  unintended consequences, and hedge f unds are no
exception. Hedge f und f orum shopping or regulatory arbitrage is one example tested here. If  a jurisdiction
imposes more onerous regulation, limiting choices of  key service providers or distribution channels f or
example, the f und is f ree to register to a more hospitable location. This had been a topical issue with some
larger f unds relocating traders f rom London to the relatively tranquil (and tax f riendly) Switzerland. Sceptics
of  greater regulation have pointed to this as an example of  the inevitable “brain drain” f rom the UK,
threatening with it the country’s posit ion as a leading hedge f und hub. Proponents are of ten glad to see
the back of  those they see as gamblers.
As in
each
chapter, the authors f rame the potential f or f orum shopping within the larger principal-agent problem.
Hedge f unds running riskier strategies may choose stricter regulatory regimes to send a signal to
investors; the theory being stricter regulation can mitigate some of  the agency conf licts. Greater investor
conf idence in turn may translate to greater capital raising by the f und. If  however hedge f unds do f orum
shop, so the logic runs, there may also be a “race to the bottom” as riskier f irms decamp to lower
regulatory havens. Alas the authors f ind no evidence of  this, with f unds running riskier strategies f ound to
be largely invariant to f und regulation. Additionally the authors f ind weak evidence of  some f unds actually
selecting jurisdictions with stricter regulations, congruent to investor ’s interests.
Although the authors lay out a meaningf ul and topical research agenda, the book is a sometimes mixed
result. On f orum shopping, the lack of  evidence thereof  is in itself  a notable result only when suf f icient
conf idence can be established the model specif ication is correct. Fund managers may move jurisdictions f or
many reasons. The af orementioned hedge f unders returned f rom Switzerland largely out of  boredom more
than anything. London will retain the best and brightest f or a plethora of  reasons, not least its attraction as
a global city. This is not to say the author ’s results are incorrect; as they themselves note, they of f er only
tentative evidence and the issue at hand is hard to pin down and to their credit they point to f urther
empirical work being required.
On agency issues, the book of ten overstates the case. Over t ime these have been mitigated more through
greater investor engagement than government regulation. Institutions, increasingly the dominant investors
in hedge f unds, are not only savvy enough to understand the intricacies of  their investments but they can
also bear higher costs to observe the manager. Inf ormational asymmetries will attenuate as the investor
base becomes more sophisticated and the contractual structure f or investors has increasingly ref lected
this.
There are some unnecessary technical shortcomings too. In f inance standard deviation alone has never
been a good measure of  risk and investors and practit ioners know this. Hedge f und returns are well known
to demonstrate non-normal distributions, rendering standard deviation inadequate at best and misleading
at worst. At a minimum the authors should acknowledge this.
Regulation, though of ten a blunt instrument, is still clearly important and the dif f erences across
jurisdictions especially so. This in itself  makes an empirical comparison across jurisdictions a worthwhile
exercise. As such, and despite its f laws, the book provides a decent introduction to some of  the issues
around hedge f und investing. The strongest chapters, particularly on the relationship between capital
raising and past perf ormance and the issues around hedge f unds misreporting their returns, are well
handled and explained nicely, outlining key concepts and the results in a manner suitable f or most students
and practit ioners. The more technically minded may wish to supplement the book with other sources but
there is certainly enough here to educate any interested general reader.
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